On Sunday morning, 26 November 2006, the inaugural meeting of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee was convened under the new leadership of MK Prof. Menachem Ben-Sasson (Kadima). This was roughly a month following the three-day information seminar (that I described in my last blog entry).
MKs present included Ben-Sasson, Moshe Gafney (Torah Judaism), Matan Vilnai (Labor), Nissim Zeev (Shas), Yitzhak Levy (National Union-NRP), Avraham Michaeli (Shas), Otniel Schneller (Kadima), Avraham Ravitz (Torah Judaism), and Reuven Rivlin (Likud).
Committee members (according to the Knesset web site) not present included Michael Eitan (Likud), Yitzhak Galant (Gil), Collette Avital (Labor), Azmi Bishara (National Democratic Assembly), Talab El-Sana (Arab Democratic Party-United Arab List), Zahava Gal'on (Meretz), Amira Dotan (Kadima), Danny Yatom (Labor), Limor Livnat (Likud), Danny Naveh (Likud), and Ophir Pines-Paz (Labor).
Not much actually occurred during this meeting. There were the expected opening remarks about the importance of the committee's work and some ground rules regarding decorum.
First, a draft proposal of the first chapter, under the heading "Democracy," defines Israel's democratic character as "parliamentary." This likely prejudices the outcome against a presidential system and therefore against a strong separation between legislative and exective branches.
Second, among the nine MKs present at this first meeting, four represented Haredi parties who are likely opposed to any significant changes towards either a presidential system, towards direct election of MKs, or towards majoritarian principles of government.
Third, at one point in the meeting, Moshe Gafney (Torah Judaism) openly stated that his party insisted on veto powers (presemably regarding specific categories of law) and that any changes at all would have to maintain that veto.
To sum up, the new Constitution and Law Committee does not seem very receptive to any significant changes to the current proportional, parliamentary system. The direction is towards some tweaks that still rely on the "goodwill" of officials still appointed by party central committees. As I've mentioned for quite some time, any real changes will have to come from immense popular pressure.
The Israeli body politic will reduce the undue influence of small, narrow interest parties when it accepts a majority system of elections and abandons the mischaracterized "proportional system." The only proportional constituency represented by the current system is the population of party dealmakers.
Sunday, November 26, 2006
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
Olmert's Grand Plan
Ehud Olmert has discovered political religion. The man who instantly leapt from number 13 on the Likud list to lead Kadima when Sharon was stricken, the operator who ran on a platform of no substance, the pol who made millions on real estate deals while in public office, the hack who, along with Sharon, welched on Likud voters by making Gaza a "self-governing" terrorist stronghold, would like us to believe that he favors principled reform.
His suggestions? First, he'd like to make it difficult or impossible for the Knesset to challenge the legitimacy of the prime minister's office. He wants to set a minimum of 66 MKs to pass a no-confidence motion and a minimum of 73 to dissolve Knesset.
Second, he'd like to empower the prime minister to dissolve the Knesset without disbanding the prime minister's office.
Third, there are changes intended to separate the cabinet from the legislature and make it more responsible to the chief executive, i.e, the PM, and subject to the PM's policy decisions. The cabinet itself would be limited to 18 ministers, one-fourth of whom would be experts in their fields who did not run for Knesset. MKs appointed ministers would quit the Knesset, but could return if they left their ministerial post.
This is reform, right? The prime minister will be empowered to implement policy, right? But there is an overpowering stench to this initiative of Olmert's. It's the stench of doublespeak and exploitation; the stench of powerhungry manipulation and demagoguery. It is the ever-growing stench of counterfeit democracy and the abuse of the privileges of public service.
Yes, the executive branch should be redesigned to operate separately from the legislature. Israel would benefit greatly from a presidential system that treats the executive branch as a public service, corporate, professional entity. Yes, government ministers must not serve concurrently as MKs, as the present system harbors a terrible conflict of interests; ministers vote on their own budgets and influence their own oversight. Yes, government ministers should be professional experts in their fields.
It is also the case that separate branches should not easily control each other, or influence the selection of each other's members. In a proper, balanced presidential system, a chief executive should not be able to dictate who shall sit in the legislature and the legislature should not be able to dictate whom the chief executive should choose to serve as his ministerial counsel.
The key word here, the principle that Olmert is either ignoring or eschewing, is that of balance. More specifically, Olmert's proposal lacks a sufficient means of balancing the powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Olmert's suggestion that a chief executive should be able to dismiss or disband the legislature, the governmental body that most directly represents the public, is a grotesque mischaracterization of responsible presidential privilege.
If Ehud Olmert truly wants to stabilize the Israeli government and empower his executive office, presumably for the sake of efficiency, accountability, and service, then there is a simple and highly effective model that has been operating for over two hundred years. It is the American presidential system that incorporates strong checks and balances against abuses of power while allowing the chief executive to fulfill a mandate as chosen by a majority of voters in his direct election.
James Madison's brilliant prescriptive analysis of the balance of powers can be found in The Federalist Papers, which should be required reading of our lawmakers, pundits, and concerned citizens.
"It is ... evident, that none of them (i.e., governmental branches,) ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their respective powers... the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others."
As Thomas Jefferson is quoted from that same document, "the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others... the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time."
So, Ehud, it makes sense that the legislature should respect the mandate of a chief executive in executing policy. What you'd better learn is that it's even more important that you keep your greedy hands off the sovereignty of the legislature in passing the laws and in checking the executive branch against abuses of power. If you should have the right to serve out a term as chief of the executive branch, then barring extreme circumstances so should every popularly elected legislator in the Knesset.
It is time for our political leaders to stop looking at failed, poorly applied European models, and look westward to a system that has never compromised on values of majority rule and individual political responsibility. Yes, we need a presidential system that allows strong leadership in executing policy; a system that rewards and validates that leadership when it excels. At the same time, we need a strong legislature, secure in its mandate to legislate the laws or our country with limited hindrance from the executive and legislative branches. The separation without balance that Olmert proposes would tip the balance of power in government heavily in favor of the executive. It is either through sheer ignorance of democratic political theory that he proposes it, or it is a self-serving power strategem worthy of dictators and soviet-style state tyranny.
In addition to a balanced presidential system that separates government branches, we need a system that helps its society form broad majorities of wide interests, complex enough that they may incorporate many categories of social minorities. This can't happen with a proportional system of electing legislative representatives. Proportionalism, after all, rewards divisiveness as smaller groups with narrow interests tip the balance of influence among larger players. The formation of a political social majority can only happen within a true majority system, in which a single representative is elected in each electoral district.
It is about time that Israel's pundits and talking heads stopped trying to perform plastic surgery to make an inefficient, divisive parliamentary system look and act like a presidential republic. We deserve and need the real thing.
His suggestions? First, he'd like to make it difficult or impossible for the Knesset to challenge the legitimacy of the prime minister's office. He wants to set a minimum of 66 MKs to pass a no-confidence motion and a minimum of 73 to dissolve Knesset.
Second, he'd like to empower the prime minister to dissolve the Knesset without disbanding the prime minister's office.
Third, there are changes intended to separate the cabinet from the legislature and make it more responsible to the chief executive, i.e, the PM, and subject to the PM's policy decisions. The cabinet itself would be limited to 18 ministers, one-fourth of whom would be experts in their fields who did not run for Knesset. MKs appointed ministers would quit the Knesset, but could return if they left their ministerial post.
This is reform, right? The prime minister will be empowered to implement policy, right? But there is an overpowering stench to this initiative of Olmert's. It's the stench of doublespeak and exploitation; the stench of powerhungry manipulation and demagoguery. It is the ever-growing stench of counterfeit democracy and the abuse of the privileges of public service.
Yes, the executive branch should be redesigned to operate separately from the legislature. Israel would benefit greatly from a presidential system that treats the executive branch as a public service, corporate, professional entity. Yes, government ministers must not serve concurrently as MKs, as the present system harbors a terrible conflict of interests; ministers vote on their own budgets and influence their own oversight. Yes, government ministers should be professional experts in their fields.
It is also the case that separate branches should not easily control each other, or influence the selection of each other's members. In a proper, balanced presidential system, a chief executive should not be able to dictate who shall sit in the legislature and the legislature should not be able to dictate whom the chief executive should choose to serve as his ministerial counsel.
The key word here, the principle that Olmert is either ignoring or eschewing, is that of balance. More specifically, Olmert's proposal lacks a sufficient means of balancing the powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Olmert's suggestion that a chief executive should be able to dismiss or disband the legislature, the governmental body that most directly represents the public, is a grotesque mischaracterization of responsible presidential privilege.
If Ehud Olmert truly wants to stabilize the Israeli government and empower his executive office, presumably for the sake of efficiency, accountability, and service, then there is a simple and highly effective model that has been operating for over two hundred years. It is the American presidential system that incorporates strong checks and balances against abuses of power while allowing the chief executive to fulfill a mandate as chosen by a majority of voters in his direct election.
James Madison's brilliant prescriptive analysis of the balance of powers can be found in The Federalist Papers, which should be required reading of our lawmakers, pundits, and concerned citizens.
"It is ... evident, that none of them (i.e., governmental branches,) ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their respective powers... the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others."
As Thomas Jefferson is quoted from that same document, "the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others... the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time."
So, Ehud, it makes sense that the legislature should respect the mandate of a chief executive in executing policy. What you'd better learn is that it's even more important that you keep your greedy hands off the sovereignty of the legislature in passing the laws and in checking the executive branch against abuses of power. If you should have the right to serve out a term as chief of the executive branch, then barring extreme circumstances so should every popularly elected legislator in the Knesset.
It is time for our political leaders to stop looking at failed, poorly applied European models, and look westward to a system that has never compromised on values of majority rule and individual political responsibility. Yes, we need a presidential system that allows strong leadership in executing policy; a system that rewards and validates that leadership when it excels. At the same time, we need a strong legislature, secure in its mandate to legislate the laws or our country with limited hindrance from the executive and legislative branches. The separation without balance that Olmert proposes would tip the balance of power in government heavily in favor of the executive. It is either through sheer ignorance of democratic political theory that he proposes it, or it is a self-serving power strategem worthy of dictators and soviet-style state tyranny.
In addition to a balanced presidential system that separates government branches, we need a system that helps its society form broad majorities of wide interests, complex enough that they may incorporate many categories of social minorities. This can't happen with a proportional system of electing legislative representatives. Proportionalism, after all, rewards divisiveness as smaller groups with narrow interests tip the balance of influence among larger players. The formation of a political social majority can only happen within a true majority system, in which a single representative is elected in each electoral district.
It is about time that Israel's pundits and talking heads stopped trying to perform plastic surgery to make an inefficient, divisive parliamentary system look and act like a presidential republic. We deserve and need the real thing.
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