Today saw the third meeting of the Knesset's constitution and law committee. The topic of defining Israel's Jewish democracy was continued. It looks as if the committee will vote to include some mention of Israel's Arab minority and possibly a characterization of Israel as a parliamentary democracy. I would not be surprised if "proportionalism" will also be proposed. These specifications would be very detrimental to the principles of public service to a citizens' constituency based on individual rights.
The following is a draft version of an opinion piece I'll be sending out soon.
Israel's Fear of its Majority
“The people have spoken,” reads a type of bumper sticker that you can find on many Israeli cars, applied to a wide variety of political stands. “The majority wants...,” is another ubiquitous refrain appended with many, sometimes contradictory, claims. Political PR efforts, supporting various initiatives and campaigns, produce such slogans to resonate with a democratic principle of majority supposedly shared by Israel's mainstream public.
In practice, Israel's political establishment rarely makes an effort to satisfy the will of any popular majority and, except for limited survey samplings by political interests, rarely polls its public. When Israelis go to the polls during elections, they don't have the final word regarding specifically who will fill the seats in their legislature. In Israel's proportional system, that privilege is left to the party central committees, who get a number of seats in proportion to their share of the popular, nationwide vote. So, there is no direct, personal representation between sitting legislators and any body of citizen constituents.
The political philosophy behind Israel's system election and its government decision-making prevents the formation of an Israeli popular majority that will dictate a national direction. Since the founding of the state, no election has seen a single party receiving a popular majority of votes. Rather than vote for a person to act as a representative and public servant of a constituency, Israelis vote for a party on the basis of the party philosophy. Benefits of this system have been dubious; setbacks include nothing less than the disintegration of Israel's national identity and its collective will. Looking forward to the future, the political and social consequences may turn out to be existentially catastrophic.
The system of post-election coalition bargaining, part and parcel of our parliamentary system, effectively removes almost any influence a popular majority might have over policymaking in the executive part of the government. The party tapped to form the government will do almost anything, including reverse its pre-election platform policy if necessary, to satisfy the minimum number of coalition partners. When the promises are empty and citizens cannot hold their representatives individually to account, citizen involvement drops; public dialogue and debate deteriorate to mere slogans and eventually disappear.
The factional system generated through proportional elections produces a weak sense of public cohesion. This, in turn, produces either weak leaders who cater to strong narrow interests or despotic leaders who act with impunity and little respect for public interests or sentiment. One case in point is Ehud Olmert, perhaps the weakest prime minister in Israel's history, who stated in an interview before Rosh Hashanah, “A prime minister has to run a country. He doesn't have to have an agenda.” An example of despotism can be seen in Ariel Sharon's 2005 rape of Israel's political norms, enabled by the weak separation between the legislature and the executive branch, a weakness facilitated by parliamentary design. It is also questionable whether this system benefits minorities over the long term, given the capricious rotation of coalition partners that occurs when it suits the individuals heading a coalition government.
In contrast, majoritarian or “direct” elections, in which candidates compete personally for single seats in geographically distributed electoral districts, encourage public debate and the consolidation of diverse interests behind fewer candidates for public office. When only one will be elected, the diverse interests in a constituency do their best to find common cause with others in order to gain influence with a popular candidate. Minority interests find political “homes” within larger camps as long as there are not contradictions with the interests or values of the larger party. In this way, over the course of majoritarian elections, popular majorities organically take form within heterogeneous populations. In turn, national identities take shape and gather strength through a heterogeneous unity. Furthermore, collective bargaining among interests take place before the election, in stark contrast to the proportional, parliamentary system. As a result, citizens can make more powerful, more dependable choices.
In such systems, political parties do their best to engage public participation beyond the vote itself. Promises made before an election are more credible because winning candidates are personally accountable to their citizens and generally plan to run for more than a single term. A line of empowerment from constituency to representative exists in parallel to a line of accountability from representative to constituency. When citizens realize they really have the influence to choose their representatives, they have long memories of their representatives' promises and performance.
So, why does Israel maintain a system of politics that prevents the formation of a popular majority? The answer itself is very, very undemocratic. Put simply, the system is designed to lock in the “status quo,” the assumed balance of power distributed among the leaders of political factions. This reverence of the status quo is most readily apparent by the lack of public debate and dialogue running up to national elections. Most of Israel's political and academic elite fear a popular majority because it could shatter age old power sharing agreements between leaders of several different communities. For this reason, the power elites oppose changes to political proportionalism and parliamentarism.
The reverence of the status quo presumes that Israel's inter-community struggles are best avoided through institutionalized factional divisions. According to this logic, political and demographic separations between ethnic communities within a country prevent friction. According to this logic, diverse ethnic communities could never find sufficient common ground to live within a single public, subject to a mainstream unifying political culture. This principle, which has been applied since the founding of the state, is erroneous because a democracy cannot long survive with separate standards for different communities. It is dangerous because it actually stymies a national consensus to form in an enlightened public while it hobbles a nation's ability to adapt to its own environmental changes.
Consider the converse principle. When the significant unit of political entitlement is the individual citizen, when ethnic groups are not institutionalized to form official government entities, there is a greater chance of preventing struggles between groups and of individuals from diverse communities finding common cause. This does not deny the existence of minority communities; it signifies that individual citizens, through their directly elected representatives, will influence how the government relates to these communities. The factions committed to living under the principles of Jewish democracy, including moderate Haredim, must accept this as the only way a Jewish national resolve can survive. Factions committed to the eradication of a Jewish democracy, including anti-Zionist and radical factions, will be marginalized as they become politically non-viable in the mainstream.
Israel's near term future is filled with difficult choices. We face challenges of a growing population and growing infrastructure needs in a land with limited resources. We face numerous challenges in the global economy. We face powerful foes dedicated to our eradication. We face the dilemma of whether to make risky concessions or to defy international pressure to serve national interests. In light of these real challenges, our country cannot survive without public confidence in its government and united commitment to its national well-being. To our detriment, however, we are politically ill-equipped to face this reality. There are quantitative and qualitative indicators showing that our national will and national cohesion are deteriorating to a dangerously low level of commitment. Israel's national will, based on the shared identity of its citizens, stands a chance of healing only when the converse of the status quo principle, the majoritarian principle, is applied. Israel must make the momentous decision to slaughter the sacred cow of the status quo and serve the sovereignty of an emergent popular majority.
Sunday, December 24, 2006
Tuesday, December 12, 2006
Constitutional Committee 10 December 2006
Yesterday, the Knesset's Committee on Constitution, Law, and Justice met for the second time under the leadership of Menachem Ben-Sasson. This meeting concentrated on the issue of the interests and considerations of Israel's Arab citizens.
Present: Menachem Ben-Sasson (Chair-Kadima), Colette Avital (Labor), Haim Oron (Meretz), Aryeh Eldad (National Unity - NRP), Moshe Gafney (Torah Judaism), Amira Dotan (Kadima), Matan Vilnai (Labor), Nissim Zeev (Shas), Avraham Michaeli (Shas), Avraham Ravitz (Torah Judaism), Reuven Rivlin (Likud), and Otniel Schneller (Kadima).
The legal consultant described a proposed clause that explicitly mentioned that the group rights of minorities, especially the Arab minority, would be recognized. This, of course, is highly problematic. Firstly, from an civil rights perspective, such a clause is completely unnecessary. There will certainly be clauses protecting the individual rights of every Israeli citizen, regardless of sex, race, religion, or ethnicity, and this should be the last word on civil rights. The proposed clause is highly problematic because it explicitly and implicitly sanctions differential treatment of members of minority groups.
Explicitly acknowledging the rights of an Arab minority, as a community and not only as individual citizens, can be interpreted as a license for the Arab community to have a different legal code than non-Arabs. Indeed, this concept surfaced later in the session.
Elyakim Rubenstein, of the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center presented his views that the constitution will honor the rights of the Arab minority.
A scholar on Arab Affairs, Michael Kariani, was invited to address the committee. He stated that he would speak from his own personal perspective. Kariani began by quoting the recently released Iraq Study Group report commissioned by President George W. Bush. The group, led by former Secretary of State James Baker III, whose anti-Israel biases are widely acknowledged, declared that the Arab-Israeli conflict is inextricably linked to Iraq and, by implication, to every other issue of instability in the Middle East. Bush has distanced himself from that and other highly problematic conclusions of the report. That Kariani would raise the report, as an introduction to his comment on the constitution, is a clear indication of the rhetorical ammunition he plans to use and to what purpose. Labeling the Arab-Israeli conflict the central cause of instability in the Middle East has been the excuse of dictators and anti-Semitic terror apologists for decades.
The meat of Kariani's address was a basic opposition to a constitution, especially one that declared Israel a Jewish and democratic state, unless there were clear safeguards and benefits for the Arab community. He called for continuing dialogue between the two communities. The clear message was that Israeli Arabs who feel like Kariani would continue and amplify their efforts to secure a special status as a "nation within a nation." The best we will be able to hope for is not a single heterogeneous, integrated Jewish/Muslim/Christian public, but a dual-national, sectarian arrangement.
Next up was Yisrael Harel, of the Institute for Zionist Strategy. Harel stressed the need to attain a "constitution of consensus" while a consensus exists. Harel doesn't realize that a consensus does not exist and will never exist; that the only hope for a constitution, and for a continued Zionist viability, is an appeal to a wide popular majority. Only by allowing a popular Zionist majority to form will Harel be able to help the country's political system withstand the challenges from both the narrow interests and the Arab, anti-Zionist minority.
Prof. Eli Reches, an Arab-affairs expert from Tel Aviv University, provided further perspective from the Arab community. Among his observations and conclusions:
The big surprise of the meeting was the pronouncement of Torah Judaism's Moshe Gafney. Gafney stated that his Haredi faction would welcome a constitution because it is the only way to stop the Supreme Court from legislating from the bench, almost always with a pronounced bias in favor of Arab and extreme left positions and against traditional, Orthodox Jewish religious positions. Gafney also qualified his support of a constitution with the caveat that it would have to be "thick" enough to ensure Haredi interests, i.e., the Haredi veto. This, of course, would be disastrous in that it would alienate most of mainstream Israel, in addition to being ethically unsound.
More than ever, I'm convinced that Israel faces systemic political challenges that could make it impossible for it to face its physical existential threats. Israel's lack of a popular majority weakens its posture in the face of an increasingly antagonistic Arab minority. Furthermore, the willingness of Israel's political elite (Meretz, Labor, Kadima) to officially accommodate Arab nationalism is tantamount to Zionist suicide.
Present: Menachem Ben-Sasson (Chair-Kadima), Colette Avital (Labor), Haim Oron (Meretz), Aryeh Eldad (National Unity - NRP), Moshe Gafney (Torah Judaism), Amira Dotan (Kadima), Matan Vilnai (Labor), Nissim Zeev (Shas), Avraham Michaeli (Shas), Avraham Ravitz (Torah Judaism), Reuven Rivlin (Likud), and Otniel Schneller (Kadima).
The legal consultant described a proposed clause that explicitly mentioned that the group rights of minorities, especially the Arab minority, would be recognized. This, of course, is highly problematic. Firstly, from an civil rights perspective, such a clause is completely unnecessary. There will certainly be clauses protecting the individual rights of every Israeli citizen, regardless of sex, race, religion, or ethnicity, and this should be the last word on civil rights. The proposed clause is highly problematic because it explicitly and implicitly sanctions differential treatment of members of minority groups.
Explicitly acknowledging the rights of an Arab minority, as a community and not only as individual citizens, can be interpreted as a license for the Arab community to have a different legal code than non-Arabs. Indeed, this concept surfaced later in the session.
Elyakim Rubenstein, of the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center presented his views that the constitution will honor the rights of the Arab minority.
A scholar on Arab Affairs, Michael Kariani, was invited to address the committee. He stated that he would speak from his own personal perspective. Kariani began by quoting the recently released Iraq Study Group report commissioned by President George W. Bush. The group, led by former Secretary of State James Baker III, whose anti-Israel biases are widely acknowledged, declared that the Arab-Israeli conflict is inextricably linked to Iraq and, by implication, to every other issue of instability in the Middle East. Bush has distanced himself from that and other highly problematic conclusions of the report. That Kariani would raise the report, as an introduction to his comment on the constitution, is a clear indication of the rhetorical ammunition he plans to use and to what purpose. Labeling the Arab-Israeli conflict the central cause of instability in the Middle East has been the excuse of dictators and anti-Semitic terror apologists for decades.
The meat of Kariani's address was a basic opposition to a constitution, especially one that declared Israel a Jewish and democratic state, unless there were clear safeguards and benefits for the Arab community. He called for continuing dialogue between the two communities. The clear message was that Israeli Arabs who feel like Kariani would continue and amplify their efforts to secure a special status as a "nation within a nation." The best we will be able to hope for is not a single heterogeneous, integrated Jewish/Muslim/Christian public, but a dual-national, sectarian arrangement.
Next up was Yisrael Harel, of the Institute for Zionist Strategy. Harel stressed the need to attain a "constitution of consensus" while a consensus exists. Harel doesn't realize that a consensus does not exist and will never exist; that the only hope for a constitution, and for a continued Zionist viability, is an appeal to a wide popular majority. Only by allowing a popular Zionist majority to form will Harel be able to help the country's political system withstand the challenges from both the narrow interests and the Arab, anti-Zionist minority.
Prof. Eli Reches, an Arab-affairs expert from Tel Aviv University, provided further perspective from the Arab community. Among his observations and conclusions:
- Israeli Arabs are increasingly becoming involved with the Palestinian national movement.
- Israeli Arabs don't see themselves as part of a national solution.
- An amalgamation of all Arab subgroups.
- A separation of Israel's democratic and Jewish characteristics in the eyes of Israeli Arabs.
- An increased activation of Naqbah rhetoric.
- Israeli Arab view of Israel as a continuation of European colonialism.
The big surprise of the meeting was the pronouncement of Torah Judaism's Moshe Gafney. Gafney stated that his Haredi faction would welcome a constitution because it is the only way to stop the Supreme Court from legislating from the bench, almost always with a pronounced bias in favor of Arab and extreme left positions and against traditional, Orthodox Jewish religious positions. Gafney also qualified his support of a constitution with the caveat that it would have to be "thick" enough to ensure Haredi interests, i.e., the Haredi veto. This, of course, would be disastrous in that it would alienate most of mainstream Israel, in addition to being ethically unsound.
More than ever, I'm convinced that Israel faces systemic political challenges that could make it impossible for it to face its physical existential threats. Israel's lack of a popular majority weakens its posture in the face of an increasingly antagonistic Arab minority. Furthermore, the willingness of Israel's political elite (Meretz, Labor, Kadima) to officially accommodate Arab nationalism is tantamount to Zionist suicide.
Sunday, November 26, 2006
First Meeting of the Constitutional Committee
On Sunday morning, 26 November 2006, the inaugural meeting of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee was convened under the new leadership of MK Prof. Menachem Ben-Sasson (Kadima). This was roughly a month following the three-day information seminar (that I described in my last blog entry).
MKs present included Ben-Sasson, Moshe Gafney (Torah Judaism), Matan Vilnai (Labor), Nissim Zeev (Shas), Yitzhak Levy (National Union-NRP), Avraham Michaeli (Shas), Otniel Schneller (Kadima), Avraham Ravitz (Torah Judaism), and Reuven Rivlin (Likud).
Committee members (according to the Knesset web site) not present included Michael Eitan (Likud), Yitzhak Galant (Gil), Collette Avital (Labor), Azmi Bishara (National Democratic Assembly), Talab El-Sana (Arab Democratic Party-United Arab List), Zahava Gal'on (Meretz), Amira Dotan (Kadima), Danny Yatom (Labor), Limor Livnat (Likud), Danny Naveh (Likud), and Ophir Pines-Paz (Labor).
Not much actually occurred during this meeting. There were the expected opening remarks about the importance of the committee's work and some ground rules regarding decorum.
First, a draft proposal of the first chapter, under the heading "Democracy," defines Israel's democratic character as "parliamentary." This likely prejudices the outcome against a presidential system and therefore against a strong separation between legislative and exective branches.
Second, among the nine MKs present at this first meeting, four represented Haredi parties who are likely opposed to any significant changes towards either a presidential system, towards direct election of MKs, or towards majoritarian principles of government.
Third, at one point in the meeting, Moshe Gafney (Torah Judaism) openly stated that his party insisted on veto powers (presemably regarding specific categories of law) and that any changes at all would have to maintain that veto.
To sum up, the new Constitution and Law Committee does not seem very receptive to any significant changes to the current proportional, parliamentary system. The direction is towards some tweaks that still rely on the "goodwill" of officials still appointed by party central committees. As I've mentioned for quite some time, any real changes will have to come from immense popular pressure.
The Israeli body politic will reduce the undue influence of small, narrow interest parties when it accepts a majority system of elections and abandons the mischaracterized "proportional system." The only proportional constituency represented by the current system is the population of party dealmakers.
MKs present included Ben-Sasson, Moshe Gafney (Torah Judaism), Matan Vilnai (Labor), Nissim Zeev (Shas), Yitzhak Levy (National Union-NRP), Avraham Michaeli (Shas), Otniel Schneller (Kadima), Avraham Ravitz (Torah Judaism), and Reuven Rivlin (Likud).
Committee members (according to the Knesset web site) not present included Michael Eitan (Likud), Yitzhak Galant (Gil), Collette Avital (Labor), Azmi Bishara (National Democratic Assembly), Talab El-Sana (Arab Democratic Party-United Arab List), Zahava Gal'on (Meretz), Amira Dotan (Kadima), Danny Yatom (Labor), Limor Livnat (Likud), Danny Naveh (Likud), and Ophir Pines-Paz (Labor).
Not much actually occurred during this meeting. There were the expected opening remarks about the importance of the committee's work and some ground rules regarding decorum.
First, a draft proposal of the first chapter, under the heading "Democracy," defines Israel's democratic character as "parliamentary." This likely prejudices the outcome against a presidential system and therefore against a strong separation between legislative and exective branches.
Second, among the nine MKs present at this first meeting, four represented Haredi parties who are likely opposed to any significant changes towards either a presidential system, towards direct election of MKs, or towards majoritarian principles of government.
Third, at one point in the meeting, Moshe Gafney (Torah Judaism) openly stated that his party insisted on veto powers (presemably regarding specific categories of law) and that any changes at all would have to maintain that veto.
To sum up, the new Constitution and Law Committee does not seem very receptive to any significant changes to the current proportional, parliamentary system. The direction is towards some tweaks that still rely on the "goodwill" of officials still appointed by party central committees. As I've mentioned for quite some time, any real changes will have to come from immense popular pressure.
The Israeli body politic will reduce the undue influence of small, narrow interest parties when it accepts a majority system of elections and abandons the mischaracterized "proportional system." The only proportional constituency represented by the current system is the population of party dealmakers.
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
Olmert's Grand Plan
Ehud Olmert has discovered political religion. The man who instantly leapt from number 13 on the Likud list to lead Kadima when Sharon was stricken, the operator who ran on a platform of no substance, the pol who made millions on real estate deals while in public office, the hack who, along with Sharon, welched on Likud voters by making Gaza a "self-governing" terrorist stronghold, would like us to believe that he favors principled reform.
His suggestions? First, he'd like to make it difficult or impossible for the Knesset to challenge the legitimacy of the prime minister's office. He wants to set a minimum of 66 MKs to pass a no-confidence motion and a minimum of 73 to dissolve Knesset.
Second, he'd like to empower the prime minister to dissolve the Knesset without disbanding the prime minister's office.
Third, there are changes intended to separate the cabinet from the legislature and make it more responsible to the chief executive, i.e, the PM, and subject to the PM's policy decisions. The cabinet itself would be limited to 18 ministers, one-fourth of whom would be experts in their fields who did not run for Knesset. MKs appointed ministers would quit the Knesset, but could return if they left their ministerial post.
This is reform, right? The prime minister will be empowered to implement policy, right? But there is an overpowering stench to this initiative of Olmert's. It's the stench of doublespeak and exploitation; the stench of powerhungry manipulation and demagoguery. It is the ever-growing stench of counterfeit democracy and the abuse of the privileges of public service.
Yes, the executive branch should be redesigned to operate separately from the legislature. Israel would benefit greatly from a presidential system that treats the executive branch as a public service, corporate, professional entity. Yes, government ministers must not serve concurrently as MKs, as the present system harbors a terrible conflict of interests; ministers vote on their own budgets and influence their own oversight. Yes, government ministers should be professional experts in their fields.
It is also the case that separate branches should not easily control each other, or influence the selection of each other's members. In a proper, balanced presidential system, a chief executive should not be able to dictate who shall sit in the legislature and the legislature should not be able to dictate whom the chief executive should choose to serve as his ministerial counsel.
The key word here, the principle that Olmert is either ignoring or eschewing, is that of balance. More specifically, Olmert's proposal lacks a sufficient means of balancing the powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Olmert's suggestion that a chief executive should be able to dismiss or disband the legislature, the governmental body that most directly represents the public, is a grotesque mischaracterization of responsible presidential privilege.
If Ehud Olmert truly wants to stabilize the Israeli government and empower his executive office, presumably for the sake of efficiency, accountability, and service, then there is a simple and highly effective model that has been operating for over two hundred years. It is the American presidential system that incorporates strong checks and balances against abuses of power while allowing the chief executive to fulfill a mandate as chosen by a majority of voters in his direct election.
James Madison's brilliant prescriptive analysis of the balance of powers can be found in The Federalist Papers, which should be required reading of our lawmakers, pundits, and concerned citizens.
"It is ... evident, that none of them (i.e., governmental branches,) ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their respective powers... the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others."
As Thomas Jefferson is quoted from that same document, "the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others... the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time."
So, Ehud, it makes sense that the legislature should respect the mandate of a chief executive in executing policy. What you'd better learn is that it's even more important that you keep your greedy hands off the sovereignty of the legislature in passing the laws and in checking the executive branch against abuses of power. If you should have the right to serve out a term as chief of the executive branch, then barring extreme circumstances so should every popularly elected legislator in the Knesset.
It is time for our political leaders to stop looking at failed, poorly applied European models, and look westward to a system that has never compromised on values of majority rule and individual political responsibility. Yes, we need a presidential system that allows strong leadership in executing policy; a system that rewards and validates that leadership when it excels. At the same time, we need a strong legislature, secure in its mandate to legislate the laws or our country with limited hindrance from the executive and legislative branches. The separation without balance that Olmert proposes would tip the balance of power in government heavily in favor of the executive. It is either through sheer ignorance of democratic political theory that he proposes it, or it is a self-serving power strategem worthy of dictators and soviet-style state tyranny.
In addition to a balanced presidential system that separates government branches, we need a system that helps its society form broad majorities of wide interests, complex enough that they may incorporate many categories of social minorities. This can't happen with a proportional system of electing legislative representatives. Proportionalism, after all, rewards divisiveness as smaller groups with narrow interests tip the balance of influence among larger players. The formation of a political social majority can only happen within a true majority system, in which a single representative is elected in each electoral district.
It is about time that Israel's pundits and talking heads stopped trying to perform plastic surgery to make an inefficient, divisive parliamentary system look and act like a presidential republic. We deserve and need the real thing.
His suggestions? First, he'd like to make it difficult or impossible for the Knesset to challenge the legitimacy of the prime minister's office. He wants to set a minimum of 66 MKs to pass a no-confidence motion and a minimum of 73 to dissolve Knesset.
Second, he'd like to empower the prime minister to dissolve the Knesset without disbanding the prime minister's office.
Third, there are changes intended to separate the cabinet from the legislature and make it more responsible to the chief executive, i.e, the PM, and subject to the PM's policy decisions. The cabinet itself would be limited to 18 ministers, one-fourth of whom would be experts in their fields who did not run for Knesset. MKs appointed ministers would quit the Knesset, but could return if they left their ministerial post.
This is reform, right? The prime minister will be empowered to implement policy, right? But there is an overpowering stench to this initiative of Olmert's. It's the stench of doublespeak and exploitation; the stench of powerhungry manipulation and demagoguery. It is the ever-growing stench of counterfeit democracy and the abuse of the privileges of public service.
Yes, the executive branch should be redesigned to operate separately from the legislature. Israel would benefit greatly from a presidential system that treats the executive branch as a public service, corporate, professional entity. Yes, government ministers must not serve concurrently as MKs, as the present system harbors a terrible conflict of interests; ministers vote on their own budgets and influence their own oversight. Yes, government ministers should be professional experts in their fields.
It is also the case that separate branches should not easily control each other, or influence the selection of each other's members. In a proper, balanced presidential system, a chief executive should not be able to dictate who shall sit in the legislature and the legislature should not be able to dictate whom the chief executive should choose to serve as his ministerial counsel.
The key word here, the principle that Olmert is either ignoring or eschewing, is that of balance. More specifically, Olmert's proposal lacks a sufficient means of balancing the powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Olmert's suggestion that a chief executive should be able to dismiss or disband the legislature, the governmental body that most directly represents the public, is a grotesque mischaracterization of responsible presidential privilege.
If Ehud Olmert truly wants to stabilize the Israeli government and empower his executive office, presumably for the sake of efficiency, accountability, and service, then there is a simple and highly effective model that has been operating for over two hundred years. It is the American presidential system that incorporates strong checks and balances against abuses of power while allowing the chief executive to fulfill a mandate as chosen by a majority of voters in his direct election.
James Madison's brilliant prescriptive analysis of the balance of powers can be found in The Federalist Papers, which should be required reading of our lawmakers, pundits, and concerned citizens.
"It is ... evident, that none of them (i.e., governmental branches,) ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their respective powers... the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others."
As Thomas Jefferson is quoted from that same document, "the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others... the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time."
So, Ehud, it makes sense that the legislature should respect the mandate of a chief executive in executing policy. What you'd better learn is that it's even more important that you keep your greedy hands off the sovereignty of the legislature in passing the laws and in checking the executive branch against abuses of power. If you should have the right to serve out a term as chief of the executive branch, then barring extreme circumstances so should every popularly elected legislator in the Knesset.
It is time for our political leaders to stop looking at failed, poorly applied European models, and look westward to a system that has never compromised on values of majority rule and individual political responsibility. Yes, we need a presidential system that allows strong leadership in executing policy; a system that rewards and validates that leadership when it excels. At the same time, we need a strong legislature, secure in its mandate to legislate the laws or our country with limited hindrance from the executive and legislative branches. The separation without balance that Olmert proposes would tip the balance of power in government heavily in favor of the executive. It is either through sheer ignorance of democratic political theory that he proposes it, or it is a self-serving power strategem worthy of dictators and soviet-style state tyranny.
In addition to a balanced presidential system that separates government branches, we need a system that helps its society form broad majorities of wide interests, complex enough that they may incorporate many categories of social minorities. This can't happen with a proportional system of electing legislative representatives. Proportionalism, after all, rewards divisiveness as smaller groups with narrow interests tip the balance of influence among larger players. The formation of a political social majority can only happen within a true majority system, in which a single representative is elected in each electoral district.
It is about time that Israel's pundits and talking heads stopped trying to perform plastic surgery to make an inefficient, divisive parliamentary system look and act like a presidential republic. We deserve and need the real thing.
Monday, October 23, 2006
Having Words
Last Thursday, the Knesset committee on the constitution, chaird by Prof. Menachem Ben-Sasson, began a three-day conference, which continued today and will conclude on Tuesday. Today's afternoon session discussed forms of government.
Over the course of three hours, the newly cobbled Hebrew word for accountability, "achrayutiut" was evoked several times. Any student of Hebrew grammar and etymology can tell you that this is a nonsense word. The ut suffix suffix changes "achrai" (responsible) into "achrayut" (responsibility). The new word, "achrayut-i-ut" is the result of tacking on a second morphing ut suffix. The morphological English equivalent of achrayutiut would be something like "responsibility-ism" or "responsibility-ness," a far cry from "accountability."
Around the time achrayutiut was being accorded a stamp of approval by Israel's academic political elite (but not by its academic linguistic elite), another Hebrew equivalent for accountability was making a much smaller splash across the national palate. "davchanut" (note the single ut) morphed directly out of the Hebrew root for "account" or "report," "le-daveach."
The dominant acceptance of achrayutiut over davchanut by the political elite says a great deal about the elite's (lack of) readiness to address the issue of public accountability. The difference between these two expressions is the difference between responsibility to act in the best interests of some entity and the accountability that can include a public justification of one's deeds. Parents are responsible to their children, however they are not normally held accountable by their children. An employee, in contrast, is responsible to his employer and normally must account for his actions through reports or third party observations. achrayut applied in the political context conceptualizes the elected official as an empowered guardian of the public rather than an empowered public servant.
This distinction was completely lost on the academic panel.
This occurence reflects the broader inability of the Israeli political elite to consider anything but a proportional electoral system. Proportionalism removes individual accountability from the political equation by officially removing the individual significance of the politician from the public's choice. It treats its sectarian, partisan constituencies like adopted wards, focusing on serving the declared interests of the party membershp but feeling little need for individual MKs to justify their actions to any public at large. The linguistic preference does not bode well for any emergent system that will place individual accountability of MKs at the head of the national political agenda.
As I walked through the Knesset, I ran into Prof. Yitzhak Gal-Noor of the Hebrew University, one of the academic panelists, none of whom had anything positive to say about the presidential system. He commented that nothing about the American system of government is applicable to Israel. When I asked why, what was so different about Israel, for lack of any specific reason, he simply said, "Because we are more European."
This one statement has affirmed every assumption I have had regarding the political and cultural preferences of the influential elite in Israel. This elite seeks to emulate Europe, to be part of Europe, and so bends over backwards at its own existential peril to curry favor with Europe. Part of this fawning is apparently the avoidance of any conceptual association with the United States, despite the latter's status as Israel's closest, most supportive strategic ally. In the eyes of the Euro-centric academic elite, any footfall in the direction of American values is simply unacceptable on its face.
Israel, like the United States and unlike most European states, is a country of immigrants. Most Israeli immigrants have arrived within the last thirty years, from non-European countries. Both Israel and the United States are multicultural. How ironic that the Israeli elite seeks towards European political values when those values have classically failed to serve Jewish interests except for the briefest periods in history.
The given dominant paradigm of the Israeli elite assumes that without proportional representation, the fabric of Israeli society will unravel. It assumes that Israelis, whether Arab, Jewish, Haredi, Secular, Muslim, Christian, Ethiopian, Sabra, - whatever - are simply incapable of thinking as individuals or of electing officials as individuals. How incredibly and outrageously demeaning! How fitting with proportionalism's notion that the sub-collective, the party central committee, must be the individual's thinking proxy. Again, how consonant with political achrayutiut over political davchanut.
These academics refuse to see that when government is provides factions with quasi-official status, through proportional party representation, the walls of factionalism become ever stronger, as do the rewards of political separatism. When the individual is forced to choose a collective as a political mediator, rather than vote for an individual representative, public service based on individual responsibility and accessibility suffers. These academics deny the reality that every individual citizen is his own minority with his own unique set of needs, outlooks, and aspirations.
In my comments, I stated that conflicts of interest are inherent in every parliamentary system, a point Prof. Reuven Chazan flatly denied. Well, technically, there might be some arrangement in which a parliamentary system could effectively prevent legislators from situations in which they have to compromise their responsibility to the public. However, as long as the legislature is charged with protecting citizens against abuses of executive power, the executive and legislative branches must be hermetically separated. In every parliamentary system that I know of, there is either no separation at all, or there are paper-thin pseudo-separations. Chazan supports the Norwegian system, in which legislators who become ministers give up their legislative positions and the seat is filled by that legislator's party's choice. This is not a conflict of interests?
Over the course of three hours, the newly cobbled Hebrew word for accountability, "achrayutiut" was evoked several times. Any student of Hebrew grammar and etymology can tell you that this is a nonsense word. The ut suffix suffix changes "achrai" (responsible) into "achrayut" (responsibility). The new word, "achrayut-i-ut" is the result of tacking on a second morphing ut suffix. The morphological English equivalent of achrayutiut would be something like "responsibility-ism" or "responsibility-ness," a far cry from "accountability."
Around the time achrayutiut was being accorded a stamp of approval by Israel's academic political elite (but not by its academic linguistic elite), another Hebrew equivalent for accountability was making a much smaller splash across the national palate. "davchanut" (note the single ut) morphed directly out of the Hebrew root for "account" or "report," "le-daveach."
The dominant acceptance of achrayutiut over davchanut by the political elite says a great deal about the elite's (lack of) readiness to address the issue of public accountability. The difference between these two expressions is the difference between responsibility to act in the best interests of some entity and the accountability that can include a public justification of one's deeds. Parents are responsible to their children, however they are not normally held accountable by their children. An employee, in contrast, is responsible to his employer and normally must account for his actions through reports or third party observations. achrayut applied in the political context conceptualizes the elected official as an empowered guardian of the public rather than an empowered public servant.
This distinction was completely lost on the academic panel.
This occurence reflects the broader inability of the Israeli political elite to consider anything but a proportional electoral system. Proportionalism removes individual accountability from the political equation by officially removing the individual significance of the politician from the public's choice. It treats its sectarian, partisan constituencies like adopted wards, focusing on serving the declared interests of the party membershp but feeling little need for individual MKs to justify their actions to any public at large. The linguistic preference does not bode well for any emergent system that will place individual accountability of MKs at the head of the national political agenda.
As I walked through the Knesset, I ran into Prof. Yitzhak Gal-Noor of the Hebrew University, one of the academic panelists, none of whom had anything positive to say about the presidential system. He commented that nothing about the American system of government is applicable to Israel. When I asked why, what was so different about Israel, for lack of any specific reason, he simply said, "Because we are more European."
This one statement has affirmed every assumption I have had regarding the political and cultural preferences of the influential elite in Israel. This elite seeks to emulate Europe, to be part of Europe, and so bends over backwards at its own existential peril to curry favor with Europe. Part of this fawning is apparently the avoidance of any conceptual association with the United States, despite the latter's status as Israel's closest, most supportive strategic ally. In the eyes of the Euro-centric academic elite, any footfall in the direction of American values is simply unacceptable on its face.
Israel, like the United States and unlike most European states, is a country of immigrants. Most Israeli immigrants have arrived within the last thirty years, from non-European countries. Both Israel and the United States are multicultural. How ironic that the Israeli elite seeks towards European political values when those values have classically failed to serve Jewish interests except for the briefest periods in history.
The given dominant paradigm of the Israeli elite assumes that without proportional representation, the fabric of Israeli society will unravel. It assumes that Israelis, whether Arab, Jewish, Haredi, Secular, Muslim, Christian, Ethiopian, Sabra, - whatever - are simply incapable of thinking as individuals or of electing officials as individuals. How incredibly and outrageously demeaning! How fitting with proportionalism's notion that the sub-collective, the party central committee, must be the individual's thinking proxy. Again, how consonant with political achrayutiut over political davchanut.
These academics refuse to see that when government is provides factions with quasi-official status, through proportional party representation, the walls of factionalism become ever stronger, as do the rewards of political separatism. When the individual is forced to choose a collective as a political mediator, rather than vote for an individual representative, public service based on individual responsibility and accessibility suffers. These academics deny the reality that every individual citizen is his own minority with his own unique set of needs, outlooks, and aspirations.
In my comments, I stated that conflicts of interest are inherent in every parliamentary system, a point Prof. Reuven Chazan flatly denied. Well, technically, there might be some arrangement in which a parliamentary system could effectively prevent legislators from situations in which they have to compromise their responsibility to the public. However, as long as the legislature is charged with protecting citizens against abuses of executive power, the executive and legislative branches must be hermetically separated. In every parliamentary system that I know of, there is either no separation at all, or there are paper-thin pseudo-separations. Chazan supports the Norwegian system, in which legislators who become ministers give up their legislative positions and the seat is filled by that legislator's party's choice. This is not a conflict of interests?
- The party's choice still bypasses direct citizen choice of particular representation.
- Factionalism and narrow interests, rather majority interests, dictate policies.
Wednesday, June 14, 2006
Israel's Ersatz Democracy
It's been some time since my first post. Over the past fifteen months I've tried in my limited way to recruit new members to the (English and Hebrew) mailing lists. Some wonderful people have hosted, and offered to host, parlor meetings. Still, despite best intentions, excuses have vastly outnumbered even the smallest of commitments. It can be maddening.
What has become apparent is the national malaise that paralyzes Israelis from real introspection and even minimal action of true self-interest. There is a widespread, personal surrender to mediocrity in Israel. We can see it in the educational system, we can see it in the government (, especially in our ineffective defense minister), and we can see it in law enforcement (as evidenced by Israel's continued infamy in human traficking, domestic violence, and non-enforcement of smoking restrictions). Another prominent indication of this mediocrity is the Israel Democracy Institute's "Constitution of Consensus."
Of course, Israel needs a constitution. We desperately need a clearer structuring of the mechanisms of government. We especially need to rein in our ambitious, but technically mediocre High Court of Justice. We need to prevent the disastrous conflicts of interest that accompany every legislator who becomes a government minister. We need to solidify our national purpose and identity. Unfortunately, the "Constitution of Consensus," or CoC, will result in none of these needed outcomes.
Largely, the CoC codifies the status quo. This should hardly be surprising as it was built into the drafting process. Rather than start with clear, effective principles of individual responsibility and public service, the Israel Democracy Institute, the IDI, focused its standards on "compromise and consensus." It brought together representatives of "various groups that make up Israeli society" to form what it considered to be a "public council." In other words, it repeated to some degree the process that occurs within the major political parties at every election. It placed people in categorical groups and sought to satisfy each group's interests in order to achieve "consensus." The "compromise" consisted of seeking to predetermine and/or circumvent decisions of political norms that should remain within the mandate of an elected legislature. They do this , in order to presumptuously "defuse the tensions" surrounding such supposedly thorny issues as Shabbat, marriage, divorce, etc.
What the IDI fails to grasp is that a democratic constitution must avoid predetermining these issues. Democracy is not just a state of affairs, it is a process. As a core document defining a working structure of government, the constitution must stick to the most basic governing relationship between the individual citizen and the state. Beyond a definition of citizenship criteria, there is no place for any formal or informal recognition of subgroups as having any influence or relative advantage in the way government functions. Issues of minority interests must play out in the political arena through processes of public discourse and legislation. For in any effective and true democracy, every individual citizen is a minority and deserves to be considered the ultimate unit of measured political influence.
The CoC also declares that Israel's legislative representation should stick to a proportional system. This perpetuates the disastrous and misguided notion that collectives are the best measure of political participation. This conclusion continues and exacerbates the tremendous waste in governing potential that has plagued Israel from inception as a modern state. When a nation officially predetermines itself as a number of categorized subgroups, its hope for a unified national identity is doomed. We can see this process of social decay in the proportional democracies of Europe as well as in Israel.
Compare this with the success and prosperity of the United States. The American Experience has shown that the democratic process reaffirms itself when it concentrates on the rights and responsibilities of the individual, not the collective, in influencing the nation's destiny. This is because individuals, with overlapping shared interests, are much more likely than sectarian groups to come to mutually beneficial decisions. Individuals are far more able than interest groups to adapt to changing situations and they are far more open to diverse propositions. There is nothing wrong with organizing active interest groups within democracy. However, there is something terribly wrong when interest groups acquire a formalized status within government, and thereby compromise the standing of the individual citizen. Unfortunately, the IDI, and several influential factors in Israeli government and society, are intent on following European models of democracy instead of the U.S. model.
Even more unfortunate is the IDI's promotion of a groupthink form of "consensus." This is an insult to every individual citizen in Israel in that it frames every subsequent debate in terms of group interests, as if the typical Israeli is incapable of individual, independent, and reasoned thought.
An Israeli constitution should be based on three basic operating principles.
No, democratic nations are not formed primarily on "compromise" and "consensus." Compromise and consensus are part of the natural political interplay among informed, empowered individuals. Nations are built primarily upon clear values and national purpose. The "Constitution of Consensus" is a cheap, mediocre facade. The real constitution that will serve the Jewish State will be written only once we have a system of true Israeli representation and responsible public service government. Let us pray we make it to that fine day.
What has become apparent is the national malaise that paralyzes Israelis from real introspection and even minimal action of true self-interest. There is a widespread, personal surrender to mediocrity in Israel. We can see it in the educational system, we can see it in the government (, especially in our ineffective defense minister), and we can see it in law enforcement (as evidenced by Israel's continued infamy in human traficking, domestic violence, and non-enforcement of smoking restrictions). Another prominent indication of this mediocrity is the Israel Democracy Institute's "Constitution of Consensus."
Of course, Israel needs a constitution. We desperately need a clearer structuring of the mechanisms of government. We especially need to rein in our ambitious, but technically mediocre High Court of Justice. We need to prevent the disastrous conflicts of interest that accompany every legislator who becomes a government minister. We need to solidify our national purpose and identity. Unfortunately, the "Constitution of Consensus," or CoC, will result in none of these needed outcomes.
Largely, the CoC codifies the status quo. This should hardly be surprising as it was built into the drafting process. Rather than start with clear, effective principles of individual responsibility and public service, the Israel Democracy Institute, the IDI, focused its standards on "compromise and consensus." It brought together representatives of "various groups that make up Israeli society" to form what it considered to be a "public council." In other words, it repeated to some degree the process that occurs within the major political parties at every election. It placed people in categorical groups and sought to satisfy each group's interests in order to achieve "consensus." The "compromise" consisted of seeking to predetermine and/or circumvent decisions of political norms that should remain within the mandate of an elected legislature. They do this , in order to presumptuously "defuse the tensions" surrounding such supposedly thorny issues as Shabbat, marriage, divorce, etc.
What the IDI fails to grasp is that a democratic constitution must avoid predetermining these issues. Democracy is not just a state of affairs, it is a process. As a core document defining a working structure of government, the constitution must stick to the most basic governing relationship between the individual citizen and the state. Beyond a definition of citizenship criteria, there is no place for any formal or informal recognition of subgroups as having any influence or relative advantage in the way government functions. Issues of minority interests must play out in the political arena through processes of public discourse and legislation. For in any effective and true democracy, every individual citizen is a minority and deserves to be considered the ultimate unit of measured political influence.
The CoC also declares that Israel's legislative representation should stick to a proportional system. This perpetuates the disastrous and misguided notion that collectives are the best measure of political participation. This conclusion continues and exacerbates the tremendous waste in governing potential that has plagued Israel from inception as a modern state. When a nation officially predetermines itself as a number of categorized subgroups, its hope for a unified national identity is doomed. We can see this process of social decay in the proportional democracies of Europe as well as in Israel.
Compare this with the success and prosperity of the United States. The American Experience has shown that the democratic process reaffirms itself when it concentrates on the rights and responsibilities of the individual, not the collective, in influencing the nation's destiny. This is because individuals, with overlapping shared interests, are much more likely than sectarian groups to come to mutually beneficial decisions. Individuals are far more able than interest groups to adapt to changing situations and they are far more open to diverse propositions. There is nothing wrong with organizing active interest groups within democracy. However, there is something terribly wrong when interest groups acquire a formalized status within government, and thereby compromise the standing of the individual citizen. Unfortunately, the IDI, and several influential factors in Israeli government and society, are intent on following European models of democracy instead of the U.S. model.
Even more unfortunate is the IDI's promotion of a groupthink form of "consensus." This is an insult to every individual citizen in Israel in that it frames every subsequent debate in terms of group interests, as if the typical Israeli is incapable of individual, independent, and reasoned thought.
An Israeli constitution should be based on three basic operating principles.
- The State of Israel is the Jewish national homeland dedicated to the well-being of the Jewish people and Jewish values.
- The government of Israel exists to serve the public of individual Israeli citizens, as electorally represented by individual Israeli citizens.
- The government of Israel shall be formed of three separate branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) which will check each other in order to operate efficiently and to prevent abuses of government power.
No, democratic nations are not formed primarily on "compromise" and "consensus." Compromise and consensus are part of the natural political interplay among informed, empowered individuals. Nations are built primarily upon clear values and national purpose. The "Constitution of Consensus" is a cheap, mediocre facade. The real constitution that will serve the Jewish State will be written only once we have a system of true Israeli representation and responsible public service government. Let us pray we make it to that fine day.
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