A dear friend of the family asked me, "Why doesn't Olmert just take his money and retire to Florida to play golf?"
Well, why should he? From his perspective, the contempt of the people is a cheap price to pay for his acquired wealth and a prestigious position on the world stage. Once he's out, he won't be getting fat envelopes from vested interests and friendly slaps on the back from George Bush. Capitulating under a cloud would cost him the adulation of the European intelligentsia who love to hear him talk about the necessity of a Palestinian state. Also, I think he's holding out for the best golden parachute he can get. At some point, Kadima will probably negotiate a deal with him, letting him resign without prosecution and minimizing the damage he might otherwise do to the party. For the damage he's done to this country, I hope his golden parachute turns out to be pyrite (the geological name for "fool's gold").
It's almost entertaining to watch the next powerball wannabes, including the clueless Tziporah Livni and the bumbling Ehud Barak, carve into Olmert's not-quite-expired political carcass. They exhibited no such indignation when rank opportunism had them hitching their careers to Olmert's briefly shooting star right when he, following Ariel Sharon, raped the Likud and the entire Israeli democratic system. It still amazes me how this parliamentary system tolerated Sharon jettisoning the Likud, rather than the converse, and retaining the reins of executive office. Kadima was born out of the valueless excesses of the nearly-indicted and the power-hungry, and it feels good to see them losing political ground.
Unfortunately, the prospects for real improvement in Israeli politics are not very compelling. Nothing will improve significantly until Israel changes its system of government and elections. As long as the proportional system prevents a mainstream majority from forming, parties will continue to play for power at the expense of national security and integrity and politicians will evade individual accountability. As long as coalition leeches demand payment for holding a government together, a leader with true integrity and grit has little staying power. That reality is what makes Shelanu's mission so vital.
Yesterday, we took another step forward by completing most of the paperwork to establish our account with Bank of Jerusalem.
Friday, May 30, 2008
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Sycophants and Scoundrels
It's interesting to contrast the political events and forces at work in the United States and in Israel. In the United States, a three-way slugfest continues among John McCain, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton to see who is most presidential, a question that seems to boil down to who can avoid thrusting his feet halfway down his throat. Questions of propriety aren't even being floated at this point. Hillary told a tall tale about a visit to Bosnia; Obama confused his uncle with his great-uncle, who liberated Buchenwald, not Auschwitz. McCain has had his share of gaffes. And, still, these three rivals do their utmost to not only manage their affairs, but to maintain an image of individual propriety.
In Israel, in contrast, the bar is so much lower that it's hard to call both systems "democracy." Israel seems to be more of a "hackocracy." Key members of Kadima, as well as cabinet members, are calling for Ehud Olmert to step down. If that weren't enough, the situation gets even more ridiculous when one Kadima MK, Yoel Hasson, suggests that even if Olmert were to step down, there should not be early elections. Just how far removed is Kadima from serving the public? Pretty far, indeed, when it seeks to shred its contract with the people, its electoral empowerment, while it clings to power.
How the mighty have fallen, one may ask? No. The mighty haven't fallen. The base and craven, empowered by collectivist proportionalism, have just sunk lower.
In Israel, in contrast, the bar is so much lower that it's hard to call both systems "democracy." Israel seems to be more of a "hackocracy." Key members of Kadima, as well as cabinet members, are calling for Ehud Olmert to step down. If that weren't enough, the situation gets even more ridiculous when one Kadima MK, Yoel Hasson, suggests that even if Olmert were to step down, there should not be early elections. Just how far removed is Kadima from serving the public? Pretty far, indeed, when it seeks to shred its contract with the people, its electoral empowerment, while it clings to power.
How the mighty have fallen, one may ask? No. The mighty haven't fallen. The base and craven, empowered by collectivist proportionalism, have just sunk lower.
Sunday, May 11, 2008
Letter to Yechiel Leiter
A week ago, I attended a Likud Anglos event to introduce Yechiel Leiter, an up-and-comer in the Likud with some impressive kudos on his resume. He spoke about, among other topics, accountability and quality of governance. After the talk, he was asked about specific reforms. Leiter indicated that he supported a hybrid system such as that suggested by the almost-forgotten Megidor Committee. In reaction to Leiter's comment, I wrote the following letter.
============
Hello, Mr. Leiter.
Your talk in Haifa last Sunday was most informative and interesting. You briefly addressed electoral reform and mentioned your interest in the mixed proportional-plurality system proposed by the Megidor Committee, the body formed by the President's Coimmission on the Examination of the Quality of Democracy in Israel. Note that it took you longer to read the name of the committee than it took for its significance to evaporate in the Israeli mindset. The Megidor Committee's proposal was the product of 70 academic and VIP egos with conflicting interests, some of whom would not even sign off on the final recommendation. "They," or at least the influential among the committee, decided on a hybrid model, to elect half of the Knesset under the current proportional method and the other half through "direct" elections.
As a guest at the opening ceremony at the Presidential residence, I spoke with committee members; their criteria for desirable outcomes of the committee were wide-ranging, to say the least. For some, the preservation of the smaller parties was paramount. For others, the elimination of small party influence was just as important. Some valued administration stability as essential, others diversity of political outlook. Some admired an American focus on individual accountability and initiative; others, the European tradition of collective ethnic representation. Clearly there was pressure to come to some compromise in order for the committtee to function. But what was good for the committee was not the best proposal for the country. I believe the report did not reflect any coherent political theory of governance; it was the product of an operational compromise. The committee members needed something to show for the political capital and prestige invested in its own enterprise, even though a third of the committee members refused to endorse the report. It is also notable that the findings of whole subcommittees, including the subcommittee on the quality of jurisprudence, had its findings omitted from the final report. For these, and other reasons, I would not hang too much authority, or even significance, on the Megidor Committee.
To date, I have not come across a theoretically analyzed, empirically supported explanation of the merits of the committee's proposal. I have searched the web exhaustively for a publicly available explanation regarding the specifics of the proposal. Why 50/50 (or rather 60/60)? What applied principles are being served? Where was the analysis of the electoral mechanism? On what basis did those who produced the report argue that such a mix would preserve the "best" of proportionalism and majoritarianism in action?
A system of representation must be consistent in its principles of application and in its cultural values. Who is being represented? What is the criteria of quality of governance? What functional role is played by the public itself? These are not merely abstract questions; they influence criteria of selection and thereby determine the dynamics and results of every authoritative decision-making process. The influence of the public furthermore affects the commitment of the public to policy outcomes.
The proportional system measures the relative extent that a collective, a political party, should influence lawmaking and, in a parliamentary system, the execution of policy. It looks upon an election as a determination of political entitlement of separate collectives. MKs are not individually accountable to any specific constituency. They are collectively accountable to the entire nation through the mediating agency of the party. In practical terms, there is no individual accountability as there is no distinguishable constituency.
The constituent plurality system is an individual hiring process played out in public. A constituency of voters constitutes the final determinant as to who is hired to represent, to vote in its interests in the legislature. Political parties have no official standing as arbiters or intermediaries between the public and elected officials. While they facilitate the exposure of candidates to constituents, the last word regarding who will and won't represent or lead still resides with the public.
The difference between the proportional and constituency systems also reflects the perception of the public. The proportional system helps a public of separate political communities avoid having to resolve political priorities and preferences. After an election, factions negotiate and either compete or cooperate. Individual citizens prioritize their vote for either a mainstream or a narrow interest party and the party takes it from there as an empowering intermediary. In essence, the proportional system does not treat the public as a single, diverse entity but rather as a collection of artificially distinct "interests." It dominates the public through an artificial, non-representative status-quo.
The constituency system presumes that the public, while diverse, can still come to a single choice as a public regarding an election outcome. It presumes that individual citizens within the public respect the election outcome as part of a situation in which even if people disagree, they accept that they share a common destiny, that through open debate they can benefit from a heterogenous group wisdom.
In Israel, the proportional system continues to exacerbate differences, to polarize and corrode the conception of the Israeli citizenry as a single public. Interest groups naturally exploit the system for sectarian gains. As long as they are elected under a system that rewards sectarian niches, there is no reason to predict that this will change. Jabotinsky may have said, "It is good to die for your country," but in a democracy that is an incomplete statement. As proportionalism has fractionated the public into franchised narrow interests, the willingness to die for one's country has clearly been affected.
In contrast, the constituency system will shore up and bolster the concept of a shared national identity, a shared destiny. Interest groups will have to find common ground, realizing that they have little chance of influencing a winning candidate if they do not. In electing a single representative for their district, citizens consider the candidate's positions on a multitude of interests, they consider the personality and propriety of the candidate. The positions and qualities of the winning candidate most often serve as a unifying influence on the body of constituents.
Why, then, do many countries practice the propotional system? Some argue that proportionalism offers "otherwise marginalized" interests a source of influence. However, whether "otherwise marginalized" minorities actually benefit is a debatable question, as is the notion that every minute political philosophy deserves formal recognition. Some argue that proportionalism is more "consensual," that more perspectives are considered in decision-making. However, as Israel's experience makes clear, the "consensus" on many issues depends on the amount of political favors narrow interests will extort. True concensus results from the deliberation of parties who have a true vested interest in the matter at hand, not from the mutual favors of otherwise disinterested parties. Individually elected representatives in Israel will be selected for their declared stands on a wide variety of issues on the national agenda.
Much more compelling explanations for the adoption of proportional systems are that they (a) allow sub-communities to influence national policy while maintaining their political isolation, and (b) enable elites to retain their advantaged status in their respective communities within a titularly broader "democracy." For these reasons, Britain exported proportionalism to colonies abroad but opted for constituent pluralities at home. For the former reason, proportionalism is the rule in several European nations characterized by geographic-ethnic divisions. And, for the latter reason, some such "democracies" degenerate into de-facto dictatorships.
What then of the "mixed" or "hybrid" systems proposed by the Megidor Committee and others? They are political "hedges," attempts to satisfy different perspectives with the (rather baseless) hope that the result will be the "best of both worlds." They are also attempts to merge two opposing political philosophies in application.
Compromise is often a necessary and beneficial practice in legislation and policy. However, the compromise of core ideals, especially of opposing ideals, in forming a democratic institution, such as a system of representation and empowerment, can lead to unmitigated disaster. This happened fifteen years ago, when the direct election of the prime minister became conditional on retaining a coalition. Immediately after the public exercised its right to elect its chief executive, the Knesset had the power to nullify it through a no-confidence vote. The PM had direct accountability while those who would sabotage or extort his administration had none. Israeli voters had split their votes, voting large party for PM and small party for Knesset, so the coalition intrigues were further plagued by the narrowest of interests. This was the result of politically "hedging" one applied principle with in incompatible applied principle.
The Megidor Committee proposed 17 districts, each of which would be represented by 2 to 5 MKs. Voters in a district would vote for an individual candidate. In one version that I read, candidates that receive the most votes relative to their competitors would take the available slots in the direct election. Those same votes would be evaluated for the proportionally elected MKs. What if you like a candidate but are not crazy about his party? In this situation, the party still acts as mediator, not as facilitatior.
Let's say, that every voter gets two votes: one for his direct, district choice of representative, the other for his national-proportional choice. What we've done is halve the number of seats going to proportionally elected MKs, thereby reducing the number of smaller party winners. The same top-tier party list members keep their seats. So, when public sentiment goes down, who is going to get the boot? Those who've secured themselves top places on their party lists or the guy who is directly elected? As a group, then, the directly elected are at a huge disadvantage and suffer as political whipping boys within and external to their party. The influence of the individually elected will be hobbled and their ability to fulfill their individual commitments to achieve will be neutralized; and in a hybrid system they will be the first voted out. In this way, the hybrid system leaves the party elites relatively untouched, secure in their seats, ever more able to leverage their political influence as patronage. The only way a direct, constituency system works is when there is a level playing field, a uniform criteria for election and retention, for every single MK.
What does, or what should, electoral reform mean for the Likud? As you noted, an outcome of Ariel Sharon's duplicitous betrayal of his party, including the formation of Kadima, was a purging of the Likud of some less-than-savory influences. The facade of quality has fallen from Kadima's image, not that many of us were taken in from its start. The Likud is in a position of presenting a fresh face, a fresh initiative, with a stronger connection to its revisionist roots. It has an unprecedented opportunity to politically re-brand itself as a party with integrity, motivation, and vision. Part of this vision should be better government. Government made up of individually accountable public servants dedicated to public service. Hybrid proposals simply will not square with commitments to public service. Israelis either immediately understand, or are quick to realize, that the mixed solution is an accommodations to entrenched powers.
Direct representation is not just a solution to "break the bank" in terms of governing efficiency; it's a philosophical commitment to action that leaves no room for preferentially accommodating any entrenched elite or separate collective interest. A Likud that declares this, that takes this stand as a leading voice of governance via individual excellence and accountability, is a Likud that will be recognized for it. At some point, the Israeli people will attach no small value to that recognition.
On Sunday night, you mentioned Gideon Sa'ar. He might remember me from a brief conversation in Ra'anana at another Likud Anglo meeting. He spoke in English on the topic of electoral reform and someone asked him why he was undertaking such a Quixotean task. Perhaps it was some difficulty with English, or the lateness of the hour, or the unexpected question; Saar humbly replied, "I don't know." I lingered afterward to speak with him, as I did with you. I told him that his response was unacceptable. He should always be ready to state, with conviction and pride, that he works at reform because it's his task as a representative legislator to serve his country as his conscience dictates. Rehabilitating Israel's system of government is one of, if not the, most urgent tasks that he must do to serve his public with integrity. He readily agreed. It's about individual excellence and the best way to get it in government is to individually elect for it.
With admiration and hope,
Michael Jaffe
Director, "Shelanu, Me'itanu, Avureinu"
============
Hello, Mr. Leiter.
Your talk in Haifa last Sunday was most informative and interesting. You briefly addressed electoral reform and mentioned your interest in the mixed proportional-plurality system proposed by the Megidor Committee, the body formed by the President's Coimmission on the Examination of the Quality of Democracy in Israel. Note that it took you longer to read the name of the committee than it took for its significance to evaporate in the Israeli mindset. The Megidor Committee's proposal was the product of 70 academic and VIP egos with conflicting interests, some of whom would not even sign off on the final recommendation. "They," or at least the influential among the committee, decided on a hybrid model, to elect half of the Knesset under the current proportional method and the other half through "direct" elections.
As a guest at the opening ceremony at the Presidential residence, I spoke with committee members; their criteria for desirable outcomes of the committee were wide-ranging, to say the least. For some, the preservation of the smaller parties was paramount. For others, the elimination of small party influence was just as important. Some valued administration stability as essential, others diversity of political outlook. Some admired an American focus on individual accountability and initiative; others, the European tradition of collective ethnic representation. Clearly there was pressure to come to some compromise in order for the committtee to function. But what was good for the committee was not the best proposal for the country. I believe the report did not reflect any coherent political theory of governance; it was the product of an operational compromise. The committee members needed something to show for the political capital and prestige invested in its own enterprise, even though a third of the committee members refused to endorse the report. It is also notable that the findings of whole subcommittees, including the subcommittee on the quality of jurisprudence, had its findings omitted from the final report. For these, and other reasons, I would not hang too much authority, or even significance, on the Megidor Committee.
To date, I have not come across a theoretically analyzed, empirically supported explanation of the merits of the committee's proposal. I have searched the web exhaustively for a publicly available explanation regarding the specifics of the proposal. Why 50/50 (or rather 60/60)? What applied principles are being served? Where was the analysis of the electoral mechanism? On what basis did those who produced the report argue that such a mix would preserve the "best" of proportionalism and majoritarianism in action?
A system of representation must be consistent in its principles of application and in its cultural values. Who is being represented? What is the criteria of quality of governance? What functional role is played by the public itself? These are not merely abstract questions; they influence criteria of selection and thereby determine the dynamics and results of every authoritative decision-making process. The influence of the public furthermore affects the commitment of the public to policy outcomes.
The proportional system measures the relative extent that a collective, a political party, should influence lawmaking and, in a parliamentary system, the execution of policy. It looks upon an election as a determination of political entitlement of separate collectives. MKs are not individually accountable to any specific constituency. They are collectively accountable to the entire nation through the mediating agency of the party. In practical terms, there is no individual accountability as there is no distinguishable constituency.
The constituent plurality system is an individual hiring process played out in public. A constituency of voters constitutes the final determinant as to who is hired to represent, to vote in its interests in the legislature. Political parties have no official standing as arbiters or intermediaries between the public and elected officials. While they facilitate the exposure of candidates to constituents, the last word regarding who will and won't represent or lead still resides with the public.
The difference between the proportional and constituency systems also reflects the perception of the public. The proportional system helps a public of separate political communities avoid having to resolve political priorities and preferences. After an election, factions negotiate and either compete or cooperate. Individual citizens prioritize their vote for either a mainstream or a narrow interest party and the party takes it from there as an empowering intermediary. In essence, the proportional system does not treat the public as a single, diverse entity but rather as a collection of artificially distinct "interests." It dominates the public through an artificial, non-representative status-quo.
The constituency system presumes that the public, while diverse, can still come to a single choice as a public regarding an election outcome. It presumes that individual citizens within the public respect the election outcome as part of a situation in which even if people disagree, they accept that they share a common destiny, that through open debate they can benefit from a heterogenous group wisdom.
In Israel, the proportional system continues to exacerbate differences, to polarize and corrode the conception of the Israeli citizenry as a single public. Interest groups naturally exploit the system for sectarian gains. As long as they are elected under a system that rewards sectarian niches, there is no reason to predict that this will change. Jabotinsky may have said, "It is good to die for your country," but in a democracy that is an incomplete statement. As proportionalism has fractionated the public into franchised narrow interests, the willingness to die for one's country has clearly been affected.
In contrast, the constituency system will shore up and bolster the concept of a shared national identity, a shared destiny. Interest groups will have to find common ground, realizing that they have little chance of influencing a winning candidate if they do not. In electing a single representative for their district, citizens consider the candidate's positions on a multitude of interests, they consider the personality and propriety of the candidate. The positions and qualities of the winning candidate most often serve as a unifying influence on the body of constituents.
Why, then, do many countries practice the propotional system? Some argue that proportionalism offers "otherwise marginalized" interests a source of influence. However, whether "otherwise marginalized" minorities actually benefit is a debatable question, as is the notion that every minute political philosophy deserves formal recognition. Some argue that proportionalism is more "consensual," that more perspectives are considered in decision-making. However, as Israel's experience makes clear, the "consensus" on many issues depends on the amount of political favors narrow interests will extort. True concensus results from the deliberation of parties who have a true vested interest in the matter at hand, not from the mutual favors of otherwise disinterested parties. Individually elected representatives in Israel will be selected for their declared stands on a wide variety of issues on the national agenda.
Much more compelling explanations for the adoption of proportional systems are that they (a) allow sub-communities to influence national policy while maintaining their political isolation, and (b) enable elites to retain their advantaged status in their respective communities within a titularly broader "democracy." For these reasons, Britain exported proportionalism to colonies abroad but opted for constituent pluralities at home. For the former reason, proportionalism is the rule in several European nations characterized by geographic-ethnic divisions. And, for the latter reason, some such "democracies" degenerate into de-facto dictatorships.
What then of the "mixed" or "hybrid" systems proposed by the Megidor Committee and others? They are political "hedges," attempts to satisfy different perspectives with the (rather baseless) hope that the result will be the "best of both worlds." They are also attempts to merge two opposing political philosophies in application.
Compromise is often a necessary and beneficial practice in legislation and policy. However, the compromise of core ideals, especially of opposing ideals, in forming a democratic institution, such as a system of representation and empowerment, can lead to unmitigated disaster. This happened fifteen years ago, when the direct election of the prime minister became conditional on retaining a coalition. Immediately after the public exercised its right to elect its chief executive, the Knesset had the power to nullify it through a no-confidence vote. The PM had direct accountability while those who would sabotage or extort his administration had none. Israeli voters had split their votes, voting large party for PM and small party for Knesset, so the coalition intrigues were further plagued by the narrowest of interests. This was the result of politically "hedging" one applied principle with in incompatible applied principle.
The Megidor Committee proposed 17 districts, each of which would be represented by 2 to 5 MKs. Voters in a district would vote for an individual candidate. In one version that I read, candidates that receive the most votes relative to their competitors would take the available slots in the direct election. Those same votes would be evaluated for the proportionally elected MKs. What if you like a candidate but are not crazy about his party? In this situation, the party still acts as mediator, not as facilitatior.
Let's say, that every voter gets two votes: one for his direct, district choice of representative, the other for his national-proportional choice. What we've done is halve the number of seats going to proportionally elected MKs, thereby reducing the number of smaller party winners. The same top-tier party list members keep their seats. So, when public sentiment goes down, who is going to get the boot? Those who've secured themselves top places on their party lists or the guy who is directly elected? As a group, then, the directly elected are at a huge disadvantage and suffer as political whipping boys within and external to their party. The influence of the individually elected will be hobbled and their ability to fulfill their individual commitments to achieve will be neutralized; and in a hybrid system they will be the first voted out. In this way, the hybrid system leaves the party elites relatively untouched, secure in their seats, ever more able to leverage their political influence as patronage. The only way a direct, constituency system works is when there is a level playing field, a uniform criteria for election and retention, for every single MK.
What does, or what should, electoral reform mean for the Likud? As you noted, an outcome of Ariel Sharon's duplicitous betrayal of his party, including the formation of Kadima, was a purging of the Likud of some less-than-savory influences. The facade of quality has fallen from Kadima's image, not that many of us were taken in from its start. The Likud is in a position of presenting a fresh face, a fresh initiative, with a stronger connection to its revisionist roots. It has an unprecedented opportunity to politically re-brand itself as a party with integrity, motivation, and vision. Part of this vision should be better government. Government made up of individually accountable public servants dedicated to public service. Hybrid proposals simply will not square with commitments to public service. Israelis either immediately understand, or are quick to realize, that the mixed solution is an accommodations to entrenched powers.
Direct representation is not just a solution to "break the bank" in terms of governing efficiency; it's a philosophical commitment to action that leaves no room for preferentially accommodating any entrenched elite or separate collective interest. A Likud that declares this, that takes this stand as a leading voice of governance via individual excellence and accountability, is a Likud that will be recognized for it. At some point, the Israeli people will attach no small value to that recognition.
On Sunday night, you mentioned Gideon Sa'ar. He might remember me from a brief conversation in Ra'anana at another Likud Anglo meeting. He spoke in English on the topic of electoral reform and someone asked him why he was undertaking such a Quixotean task. Perhaps it was some difficulty with English, or the lateness of the hour, or the unexpected question; Saar humbly replied, "I don't know." I lingered afterward to speak with him, as I did with you. I told him that his response was unacceptable. He should always be ready to state, with conviction and pride, that he works at reform because it's his task as a representative legislator to serve his country as his conscience dictates. Rehabilitating Israel's system of government is one of, if not the, most urgent tasks that he must do to serve his public with integrity. He readily agreed. It's about individual excellence and the best way to get it in government is to individually elect for it.
With admiration and hope,
Michael Jaffe
Director, "Shelanu, Me'itanu, Avureinu"
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