Monday, October 23, 2006

Having Words

Last Thursday, the Knesset committee on the constitution, chaird by Prof. Menachem Ben-Sasson, began a three-day conference, which continued today and will conclude on Tuesday. Today's afternoon session discussed forms of government.

Over the course of three hours, the newly cobbled Hebrew word for accountability, "achrayutiut" was evoked several times. Any student of Hebrew grammar and etymology can tell you that this is a nonsense word. The ut suffix suffix changes "achrai" (responsible) into "achrayut" (responsibility). The new word, "achrayut-i-ut" is the result of tacking on a second morphing ut suffix. The morphological English equivalent of achrayutiut would be something like "responsibility-ism" or "responsibility-ness," a far cry from "accountability."

Around the time achrayutiut was being accorded a stamp of approval by Israel's academic political elite (but not by its academic linguistic elite), another Hebrew equivalent for accountability was making a much smaller splash across the national palate. "davchanut" (note the single ut) morphed directly out of the Hebrew root for "account" or "report," "le-daveach."

The dominant acceptance of achrayutiut over davchanut by the political elite says a great deal about the elite's (lack of) readiness to address the issue of public accountability. The difference between these two expressions is the difference between responsibility to act in the best interests of some entity and the accountability that can include a public justification of one's deeds. Parents are responsible to their children, however they are not normally held accountable by their children. An employee, in contrast, is responsible to his employer and normally must account for his actions through reports or third party observations. achrayut applied in the political context conceptualizes the elected official as an empowered guardian of the public rather than an empowered public servant.

This distinction was completely lost on the academic panel.

This occurence reflects the broader inability of the Israeli political elite to consider anything but a proportional electoral system. Proportionalism removes individual accountability from the political equation by officially removing the individual significance of the politician from the public's choice. It treats its sectarian, partisan constituencies like adopted wards, focusing on serving the declared interests of the party membershp but feeling little need for individual MKs to justify their actions to any public at large. The linguistic preference does not bode well for any emergent system that will place individual accountability of MKs at the head of the national political agenda.

As I walked through the Knesset, I ran into Prof. Yitzhak Gal-Noor of the Hebrew University, one of the academic panelists, none of whom had anything positive to say about the presidential system. He commented that nothing about the American system of government is applicable to Israel. When I asked why, what was so different about Israel, for lack of any specific reason, he simply said, "Because we are more European."

This one statement has affirmed every assumption I have had regarding the political and cultural preferences of the influential elite in Israel. This elite seeks to emulate Europe, to be part of Europe, and so bends over backwards at its own existential peril to curry favor with Europe. Part of this fawning is apparently the avoidance of any conceptual association with the United States, despite the latter's status as Israel's closest, most supportive strategic ally. In the eyes of the Euro-centric academic elite, any footfall in the direction of American values is simply unacceptable on its face.

Israel, like the United States and unlike most European states, is a country of immigrants. Most Israeli immigrants have arrived within the last thirty years, from non-European countries. Both Israel and the United States are multicultural. How ironic that the Israeli elite seeks towards European political values when those values have classically failed to serve Jewish interests except for the briefest periods in history.

The given dominant paradigm of the Israeli elite assumes that without proportional representation, the fabric of Israeli society will unravel. It assumes that Israelis, whether Arab, Jewish, Haredi, Secular, Muslim, Christian, Ethiopian, Sabra, - whatever - are simply incapable of thinking as individuals or of electing officials as individuals. How incredibly and outrageously demeaning! How fitting with proportionalism's notion that the sub-collective, the party central committee, must be the individual's thinking proxy. Again, how consonant with political achrayutiut over political davchanut.

These academics refuse to see that when government is provides factions with quasi-official status, through proportional party representation, the walls of factionalism become ever stronger, as do the rewards of political separatism. When the individual is forced to choose a collective as a political mediator, rather than vote for an individual representative, public service based on individual responsibility and accessibility suffers. These academics deny the reality that every individual citizen is his own minority with his own unique set of needs, outlooks, and aspirations.

In my comments, I stated that conflicts of interest are inherent in every parliamentary system, a point Prof. Reuven Chazan flatly denied. Well, technically, there might be some arrangement in which a parliamentary system could effectively prevent legislators from situations in which they have to compromise their responsibility to the public. However, as long as the legislature is charged with protecting citizens against abuses of executive power, the executive and legislative branches must be hermetically separated. In every parliamentary system that I know of, there is either no separation at all, or there are paper-thin pseudo-separations. Chazan supports the Norwegian system, in which legislators who become ministers give up their legislative positions and the seat is filled by that legislator's party's choice. This is not a conflict of interests?
  • The party's choice still bypasses direct citizen choice of particular representation.
  • Factionalism and narrow interests, rather majority interests, dictate policies.
The only way that this, and most, parliamentary systems might argue that they do not entrench conflicts of interest is by arguing that every legislator and every citizen fits neatly into a perfectly matched party philosophy.

Wednesday, June 14, 2006

Israel's Ersatz Democracy

It's been some time since my first post. Over the past fifteen months I've tried in my limited way to recruit new members to the (English and Hebrew) mailing lists. Some wonderful people have hosted, and offered to host, parlor meetings. Still, despite best intentions, excuses have vastly outnumbered even the smallest of commitments. It can be maddening.

What has become apparent is the national malaise that paralyzes Israelis from real introspection and even minimal action of true self-interest. There is a widespread, personal surrender to mediocrity in Israel. We can see it in the educational system, we can see it in the government (, especially in our ineffective defense minister), and we can see it in law enforcement (as evidenced by Israel's continued infamy in human traficking, domestic violence, and non-enforcement of smoking restrictions). Another prominent indication of this mediocrity is the Israel Democracy Institute's "Constitution of Consensus."

Of course, Israel needs a constitution. We desperately need a clearer structuring of the mechanisms of government. We especially need to rein in our ambitious, but technically mediocre High Court of Justice. We need to prevent the disastrous conflicts of interest that accompany every legislator who becomes a government minister. We need to solidify our national purpose and identity. Unfortunately, the "Constitution of Consensus," or CoC, will result in none of these needed outcomes.

Largely, the CoC codifies the status quo. This should hardly be surprising as it was built into the drafting process. Rather than start with clear, effective principles of individual responsibility and public service, the Israel Democracy Institute, the IDI, focused its standards on "compromise and consensus." It brought together representatives of "various groups that make up Israeli society" to form what it considered to be a "public council." In other words, it repeated to some degree the process that occurs within the major political parties at every election. It placed people in categorical groups and sought to satisfy each group's interests in order to achieve "consensus." The "compromise" consisted of seeking to predetermine and/or circumvent decisions of political norms that should remain within the mandate of an elected legislature. They do this , in order to presumptuously "defuse the tensions" surrounding such supposedly thorny issues as Shabbat, marriage, divorce, etc.

What the IDI fails to grasp is that a democratic constitution must avoid predetermining these issues. Democracy is not just a state of affairs, it is a process. As a core document defining a working structure of government, the constitution must stick to the most basic governing relationship between the individual citizen and the state. Beyond a definition of citizenship criteria, there is no place for any formal or informal recognition of subgroups as having any influence or relative advantage in the way government functions. Issues of minority interests must play out in the political arena through processes of public discourse and legislation. For in any effective and true democracy, every individual citizen is a minority and deserves to be considered the ultimate unit of measured political influence.

The CoC also declares that Israel's legislative representation should stick to a proportional system. This perpetuates the disastrous and misguided notion that collectives are the best measure of political participation. This conclusion continues and exacerbates the tremendous waste in governing potential that has plagued Israel from inception as a modern state. When a nation officially predetermines itself as a number of categorized subgroups, its hope for a unified national identity is doomed. We can see this process of social decay in the proportional democracies of Europe as well as in Israel.

Compare this with the success and prosperity of the United States. The American Experience has shown that the democratic process reaffirms itself when it concentrates on the rights and responsibilities of the individual, not the collective, in influencing the nation's destiny. This is because individuals, with overlapping shared interests, are much more likely than sectarian groups to come to mutually beneficial decisions. Individuals are far more able than interest groups to adapt to changing situations and they are far more open to diverse propositions. There is nothing wrong with organizing active interest groups within democracy. However, there is something terribly wrong when interest groups acquire a formalized status within government, and thereby compromise the standing of the individual citizen. Unfortunately, the IDI, and several influential factors in Israeli government and society, are intent on following European models of democracy instead of the U.S. model.

Even more unfortunate is the IDI's promotion of a groupthink form of "consensus." This is an insult to every individual citizen in Israel in that it frames every subsequent debate in terms of group interests, as if the typical Israeli is incapable of individual, independent, and reasoned thought.

An Israeli constitution should be based on three basic operating principles.
  • The State of Israel is the Jewish national homeland dedicated to the well-being of the Jewish people and Jewish values.
  • The government of Israel exists to serve the public of individual Israeli citizens, as electorally represented by individual Israeli citizens.
  • The government of Israel shall be formed of three separate branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) which will check each other in order to operate efficiently and to prevent abuses of government power.
On the basis of these principles, we should have a directly and separately elected chief executive who will manage the executive branch as an efficient public service organization. hw will have the discretion to staff the executive managerial staff with individuals confirmed by the legislature. No individual should serve concurrently in more than one branch of government. The legislature should be elected in order to represent Israelis as individuals, not as political collectives. For this reason, every single Member of Knesset should be elected as the single representative of an electoral district.

No, democratic nations are not formed primarily on "compromise" and "consensus." Compromise and consensus are part of the natural political interplay among informed, empowered individuals. Nations are built primarily upon clear values and national purpose. The "Constitution of Consensus" is a cheap, mediocre facade. The real constitution that will serve the Jewish State will be written only once we have a system of true Israeli representation and responsible public service government. Let us pray we make it to that fine day.

Tuesday, March 15, 2005

Welcome!

This blog is for people who love Israel... and hate the way Israel's political system is crushing the hope for honest, decent government.

Israel's proportional system of election to the Knesset has guaranteed that small, narrow-interest parties will stymie political and social progress in the country. Israel's proportional system makes Members of Knesset responsible first and foremost to the party leadership, not to the people. The coalition system of government formation guarantees that political cronies, rather than competent professionals, will manage crucial government offices. Scandals that would be outrageous in decent democratic systems are commonplace and accepted here.

It's time for a change, time to take an accounting and open our eyes. Israel needs a constitution. Israel needs a solid system of political checks and balances. Israel needs a political culture of accountability and individual responsibility among its lawmakers.

Israelis and those who love Israel must come together to make this happen. Today's Israeli politicians certainly aren't motivated to make such a change, so it has to come from Israel's grass roots and from supporters abroad. We can do this.

This blog will follow the progress towards these changes. For more information on Direct Representation for Israel, go to http://www.directrepisrael.org/EN/